Summaries of the concept of hegemony from Gramsci to Laclau and Mouffe

The purpose of this article is to compare and contrast Antônio Gramsci's and Ernesto Laclau's viewpoints on hegemony, highlighting the similarities and discrepancies between them. As a response to changing social arrangements, the Marxist tradition introduces the concept of hegemony. Despite having its roots in Russian Social Democracy and being apparent in Lenin's philosophy, Gramsci expanded on the concept. Laclau and Mouffe have created a new approach to hegemony in recent decades, using it to think about the social configuration of late capitalism and observe how hegemonic conflicts evolve in this new social arena.

Hegemony, discourse theory, Marxist social theory, and post-marxism are some of the terms used to describe hegemony.

The purpose of this essay is to compare and contrast Antonio Gramsci's and Ernesto Laclau's and Chantal Mouffe's ideas on hegemony, highlighting the similarities and differences between them. Gramsci extended the concept of hegemony further within the Marxist tradition as a response to new social configurations. Laclau and Mouffe created a new approach to hegemony in the last few decades, expanding the gramscian notion for thinking about late capitalism's social configuration and monitoring how hegemonic battles evolve in the new social environment.

Hegemony, discourse theory, social Marxist theory, and post-marxism are some of the terms used to describe hegemony.

Hegemony as a concept: from Gramsci to Laclau and Mouffe

The concept of hegemony: from Gramsci to Laclau and Mouffe

Alves, Ana Rodrigues Cavalcanti

Master's student at UFPE's Postgraduate Program in Sociology and recipient of a CNPq scholarship

ABSTRACT

Keywords: Hegemony; Discourse theory; Marxist social theory; Post-Marxism.

ABSTRACT

Hegemony; Discourse theory; Social Marxist Theory; Post-Marxism are some of the terms used in this paper.

The Marxist tradition coined the term "hegemony" to describe the various social arrangements that arose at various moments in time and location. Despite its roots in Russian social democracy and Lenin, Gramsci is the one who gives a more elaborate and adequate notion of hegemony to think about social connections without falling into the banal materialism and idealism of the past. The concept of hegemony suggests a new relationship between structure and superstructure, attempting to move away from the primacy of the first over the second by emphasising the importance of superstructures in advanced society research. In this framework, civil society, as well as ideology, which appears to be constitutive of social connections, take centre stage. In this manner,

However, in recent decades, a new approach to hegemony has arisen, aiming to broaden Gramscian thinking in order to consider the social configuration of late capitalism and observe how hegemonic conflicts develop in this new social arena. In Hegemony and Socialist Strategy, Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe pointed out the limitations and ambiguities of Gramsci's theory of hegemony and proposed a new concept based on the intersection of Gramscian political logic and a collection of post-structuralist categories. As a result, the main goal of this paper is to compare and contrast Gramsci's definition of hegemony with that of Laclau and Mouffe, highlighting the parallels and differences between the two perspectives.

Gramsci, according to Anderson (1989), sits at a crossroads between the first generation of Marxism and Western Marxism. 1. The attempt to explain why the proletarian revolution did not occur in the West and what conditions favoured the emergence of a revolution in Russia is important to the Western Marxist tradition. Gramsci emphasises the fundamental disparities between East and West social formations, as well as the need for different political techniques than those used in Russia, because sophisticated capitalism allowed Western countries to establish superstructures as well (Coutinho, 1992). Gramsci develops his concept of hegemony based on these ideas, and is often regarded as the Marxist theorist who most insisted on this subject and made a significant contribution to Marxism (Gruppi, 1978; Macciochi, 1976).

The biggest obstacle in gaining power in mature capitalist society had already been noted by Lenin, and while he never spoke directly about hegemony, Gramsci credits him as the originator of the notion, which has had a significant influence on his thinking and political action ( Coutinho, 1992). "The most persistent and fundamental point of interaction between Gramsci and Lenin would be the concept of hegemony," writes Luciano Gruppi (1978, p. 1).

Hugues Portelli (1977, p. 63) cites Luciano Gruppi's article "Lenin e il concetto di egemonia," which highlights the approximation points of the concept of hegemony in Gramsci and Lenin, such as their basis of class, intellectual organisation, the need to expand the social base of the fundamental class, and analysis of the correlation of forces in the hegemony dispute. However, Portelli reminds out that these authors' conceptions of hegemony are fundamentally different. While Lenin solely refers to the proletariat's dictatorship when speaking about hegemony, emphasising its coercive nature, Gramsci emphasises the significance of building a ruling class that is sustained by the consent of the masses rather than coercion. Furthermore, Gramsci emphasises the importance of cultural and ideological orientation, which Portelli considers to be the most significant difference between the two authors; after all, Lenin insists on hegemony's exclusively political character. Portelli puts it this way: (1977, p. 65),

The overthrow of the state apparatus by violence is the essential problem for him [Lenin]: political society is the goal, and in order to achieve it, political hegemony is required: political hegemony because political society is more important, in terms of strategic concerns, than civil society [...] Gramsci, on the other hand, sees civil society as the crucial battleground in the fight against the ruling class: the party that controls it is hegemonic, and the conquest of political society crowns this hegemony, extending it to the entire State (civil society plus political society). The primacy of civil society over political society is referred to as Gramscist hegemony.

Despite this fundamental difference, Gramsci attempts to maintain the notion of Leninist hegemony based on the theoretical-practical principle, which he considers to be Lenin's greatest contribution to the philosophy of praxis in terms of progressing political doctrine and practise. In this sense, the necessity for unification between theory and practise, as well as the development of a new worldview, is referred to as the consolidation of a hegemonic apparatus.

According to Gramsci, it is very typical for a social group in a position of subordination in relation to another group to embrace its conception of the universe, even if it contradicts its practical action. Furthermore, he notes that the mechanically imposed conception of the world is devoid of critical consciousness and coherence, as well as being disaggregated and sporadic. This unthinking acceptance of another social group's worldview results in a conflict between thinking and behaving, as well as the coexistence of two worldviews represented in words and effective action. As a result, Gramsci (1978a, p. 15) concludes, "the philosophy of politics cannot be separated out; on the contrary, it can be proven that the choosing and critique of a world conception are political occurrences."

He claims that the challenge with any worldview that has evolved into a cultural movement that has resulted in actual activity is precisely to maintain the intellectual unity of any social bloc. The Catholic Church, for example, has long worked for the doctrinal unity of the entire "religious mass" so that intellectual strata and "common men" are not separated in its midst and two faiths are not formed. In this sense, a philosophical movement that aspires to cultural unity must avoid this divide between academics and the general public. This principle of unity is similar to what must exist between theory and practise: intellectuals must participate in the practical life of the social group they represent and belong to, making the problems raised by the group in its practical activity coherent and forming a social and cultural bloc, which Gramsci refers to as the organic intellectual bloc (1978a, p. 16). However,

Unlike the Catholic stance, the philosophy of praxis attempts to lead "simpletons" to a better conception of life rather than keeping people in their primitive common sense philosophy. It is precisely to forge an intellectual-moral bloc that makes intellectual progress politically possible that it asserts the need for contact between intellectuals and "simple people." This is not to limit scientific activity and maintain unity at the lowest level of the masses, but to forge an intellectual-moral bloc that makes intellectual progress politically possible (Gramsci, 1978a, p. 18).

Critical consciousness, according to Gramsci, is attained through a struggle between opposing hegemonies, first in the realm of ethics, then in the realm of politics, culminating in a superior elaboration of a vision of the real. As a result, he highlights the importance of viewing the political evolution of the concept of hegemony as more than just politico-practical advancement.

a significant philosophical advance, because it entails and presupposes an intellectual unity and an ethics suitable to a perception of the world that goes beyond common sense and becomes critical, even if within still limited bounds (Gramsci, 1978a, p. 21)

In another passage he states that

It is a reality of knowledge, a philosophical fact, that the implementation of a hegemonic apparatus, while producing a new ideological terrain, mandates a reform of consciences and means of knowledge (Gramsci, 1978a, p. 52).

Gramsci, like Lenin, believes that the working class does not arrive at this critical consciousness on its own, that it does not become independent "by itself" without organising itself; this organisation must come from "outside," and it directly addresses the political question of intellectuals, in the sense that there is no organisation without intellectuals, according to Gramsci. The theoretical-practical link, the nexus that connects the structure to the superstructure, is represented by these. The importance of an external orientation to the social group stems from the need for the new worldview to encompass not only the immediate worker-boss relationship, but also the relationships of all social classes with one another and with the state; this provides a global view of society rather than just the proletariat's immediate experience (Gruppi, 1978, p. 36).

Gramsci (1978c) highlights the importance of the political party in the modern world since, in the party, the elements of an economic social group overcome the stage of their historical development and become agents of general actions, both national and worldwide, according to him. He considers the political party to be Machiavelli's modern prince, in charge of the construction of a collective will. Unlike Machiavelli's plan, however, the prince of the modern world cannot be a single person, but rather a complex aspect of society that manifests the realisation of a recognised and partially based on action collective will. This complex organism, according to Gramsci, is already determined by historical evolution and is the political party;

The grounds for consecutive failures in attempts to build a national-popular collective will are due to the dominance of an economic-corporatist stance on the part of particular social groups, which prevents their social base from expanding (Gramsci, 1978b). The main mission of the workers' party, according to Lenin, was to help the working class overcome their unionist awareness and supply the theoretical ingredients for this consciousness to attain to the level of totality (Coutinho, 1992, pp. 103-104). Gramsci, following Lenin's lead, defines the existence of urban groups developed in the industrial field that have reached a certain level of historical-political culture as necessary conditions for the emergence of a national-popular collective, as well as the adhesion of the peasant masses and their participation in political life. In this sense, the contemporary prince's task is to develop not just a proletarian but also a national-popular collective will, as well as an intellectual and moral reform that allows corporate principles to be overcome (Gramsci, 1978b, pp. 7). -9).

Furthermore, Gramsci claims that joining a political party is the best approach to strengthen the leaders' leadership abilities. Even if each political party represents a single social group, it must strike a balance between the interests of that group and those of other social groups in order to increase its social base and progress with the permission and support of allied and even opposing groups (Gramsci, 1978b, p. 22).

The formation of a hegemonic apparatus necessitates the extension of the fundamental class's social base through a system of alliances and the conquest of other groups by consensus. As a result, Gramsci emphasises that hegemony should not be viewed as a matter of subordination to the hegemonic group; rather, it necessitates consideration of the interests of the groups over which hegemony will be exercised, the establishment of a compromise relationship, and the making of economic-corporate sacrifices. He does point out, however, that these compromises never affect the hegemonic group's core qualities, because if hegemony is ethical-political, it is also economic (Gramsci, 1978b, p. 33).

Another crucial thing to consider in the debate about the formation of a hegemonic machinery is that

Weapons and compulsion are merely a methodological hypothesis; the only real option is compromise, because force can only be employed against enemies, not against a part of oneself that one wants to adapt swiftly and from which enthusiasm is necessary. as well as goodwill (Gramsci, 1978b, p. 33).

However, according to Portelli (1977), hegemony is not exerted over the entire society, but only over the allied groups, and the ruling class employs force to keep the opposition classes at bay. That is why a ruling and ruling class can exist at the same time. In the words of Gramsci (2002, pp. 62-63),

group supremacy manifests itself in two ways, as "dominion" and as "intellectual and moral leadership." A social group dominates opposing groups, which it seeks to "liquidate" or to submit even with armed force, and directs allied and related groups. A social group can and, moreover, must be a leader even before conquering governmental power (this is one of the fundamental conditions even for the conquest of power itself); then, when he exercises power and even if he holds it strongly in his hands, he becomes dominant, but he must also continue to be [leader].

Another crucial thing to consider in the debate about the formation of a hegemonic machinery is that

The important feature of hegemony, according to Portelli (1977, p. 69), is the development of an ideological bloc that permits the ruling class to maintain an intellectual monopoly by attracting other layers of intellectuals. He points out, however, that the fundamental class's ideological monopoly ensures not only that it exercises its ruling function, but also that it exercises its dominant function, as in the case of "transformism," which entails the absorption of intellectuals from enemy groups and the decapitation of the fundamental class's political and ideological direction. When speaking of the Risorgimento in Italy, Gramsci (2002) highlights the transformative process by describing it as a "quiet revolution." According to him, the Action Party failed to impress a popular character in the Risorgimento movement because he was drawn to and inspired by the moderate party.

In this sense, if the lower classes want to form a new historical bloc, they must build their own hegemonic apparatus, complete with their own political and ideological agenda. As a result, the first step would be to challenge the ruling class's hegemony and dominant ideology (Portelli, 1977). Furthermore, the forming of a new social group's own layer of intellectuals, which is tied to the group's practical activity and, as a result, can provide a worldview that is consistent with this practise and clarify the group's historical function - its organic intellectuals - is essential. Every social group aspiring to supremacy, according to Gramsci (1978c), must attempt to integrate conventional intellectuals, representatives of the prior economic order, and designers of the ruling class's hegemonic system.

Gramsci's understanding of the primacy of civil society in advanced democracies led him to emphasise the importance of battling the ruling class, particularly in the ideological realm. Gramsci recognises that civil society looks to be weakly structured in the East and with a very powerful structure in the West in his examination of economic and social formations in the East and West. As a result, the Bolsheviks' method of seizing power in Russia, which was characterised by the use of coercion and a "war of movement," could not be replicated in the West. As a result, fights in the West must be waged within the framework of civil society, in a "positional war" with the goal of conquering.

As a condition for gaining access to state power and maintaining it, the majority sectors of the public must agree on roles and spaces, as well as a political-ideological direction (Coutinho, 1992, p. 89).

This balanced relationship between the State and civil society in the West makes it impossible to overstate the relevance of immediate economic calamities in the disintegration of the dominant bloc and a strategy based on movement warfare (Coutinho, 1992, p. 92). In this sense, the emergence of a new historical bloc by the lower classes presupposes not only the emergence of a new hegemonic system, but also a hegemonic crisis of the ruling class, which can occur when the ruling class fails in some endeavour or when large masses leave their passivity and enter political life, presenting a certain organisation and set of demands, albeit under limited conditions (Gramsci, 1978b, p. 55).

The ruling class loses control of the subordinate classes during a hegemony crisis when they split with the intellectuals who represent them; this is the situation with the intellectuals who dominate civil society and, more specifically, established political parties (Portelli, 1977, p. 104). Gramsci put it this way: (1978b, p. 54),

Social groups move away from their traditional parties, that is, traditional parties with some form of organisation, with certain men who constitute, represent, and direct them, at a certain point in their historical lives, and are no longer recognised as their own expression of their class or fraction of class.

Even in the midst of a crisis of authority, Gramsci points out, the ruling class has an advantage over the subaltern classes in that it has a large number of well-trained employees who can change their programme and restore control more quickly (Gramsci, 1978b, p. 55). Furthermore, according to Portelli (1977, p. 109), the hegemony problem primarily affects civil society, and the ruling class transforms into the governing class, preserving control of political society, i.e., the State apparatus and coercion. As a result, after defining the ideological direction of the new historical bloc, the subordinate classes must prepare a political-military response to the ruling class's hegemonic system.

Theorizing the concept of hegemony in Gramsci's theory, according to Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe (2004), is one of the most elaborate attempts to respond to the so-called "crisis of Marxism." According to them, the origins of this crisis can be traced back to the Second International, and it stems from the increasing difficulty of adapting Marxism's theoretical categories to the transformations of capitalist society, which are characterised by the fragmentation of social classes, as well as the opacity and contingency of the social. This new social configuration ran counter to Marx's assumptions about increasing proletarianization and social polarisation, as well as his consideration of the working class's unity and universality, destined to establish a socialist society through revolution. Rather of systematising observable historical processes, Marxist Theory attempts to stop capitalism's fragmenting tendencies and guarantee what would be the "natural flow of history." Within the Marxist tendency, the division between theory and practise is a sign of the crisis (Burity, 1997).

In this setting, orthodoxy, Bernstein's revisionism, and Sorel's revolutionary syndicalism emerge as the key solutions to Marxism's crisis. The answer of orthodox Marxism was, in general, to assert the transitory nature of capitalism's tendencies, because its theoretical premises would be ensured in the future by the economy's evolutionary movement, which would overcome dispersion and fragmentation (Laclau and Mouffe, 2004).

Bernstein's revisionism is a step forward in that it upholds the idea that class unity can only be secured through autonomous political action, thus ensuring the political's autonomy in relation to the infrastructural.

two. However, the authors point out that revisionism has theoretical limitations because it does not explain how political unity necessarily leads to a class identity by arguing that it is developed autonomously at the political level. Politics, they argue, cannot ensure the class character of unitary subjects (Laclau and Mouffe, 2004).

Revolutionary syndicalism, on the other hand, is ahead of other theories in emphasising contingency, rejecting evolutionism and substituting the concept of mélange for social totality; he views social classes as poles of aggregation of forces, as opposed to the structural concept of class. Furthermore, in nature, the conflicting forces' unity is regarded as fictitious. However, the subject's mythical reconstruction also relates to a class character (Burity, 1997). Joanildo Burity (1997, p. 11) says of all of these reactions, "

Despite their obvious differences, all of these alternatives face the same dilemma: infrastructure's inadequacy as a guarantee of class unity in the present is not overcome by politics, which, even if it is capable of building unity in the present, cannot guarantee that this unit will have a class character. There is a dualistic aspect in all of them that can only account for the link between necessity and contingency as a limitation of one by the other, in a boundary relationship. But the two poles are not on the same level: indeterminacy's limitations are defined by determination (by establishing its specificity - as determination by the economic - as required), making it a mere complement.

Despite the limitations of all of these attempts to respond to Marxism's crisis, Joanildo Burity (1997, p. 8) emphasises that they stand out for their growing sensitivity to the contingency of the historical and political process, as well as the fact that their discourses deconstruct Marxism very little. right now In this framework, the idea of hegemony emerges to fill the hole left by Marx's historical necessity category and to respond to actual contingency situations.

The concept of hegemony first appeared in Russian Social Democracy to characterise the bourgeoisie's inability to carry out its own responsibilities, forcing the working class to emerge from itself and take on tasks that were not its own. In a historical environment of contingency, the central concern was determining how to best endow workers' fights with maximum political effectiveness. According to Laclau and Mouffe (2004, p. 80), the concept of hegemony relates to an abnormal relationship from the perspective of Russian social democracy, because there is a divide between the class nature of a job and the historical actor who executes it. The contradiction between a required interior, which corresponds to the normal evolution in the execution of a class duty, and a contingent exterior, in which a class takes on tasks that are not its own, occurs in this way. However, the authors point out that, while hegemony had a positive connotation in Russian social democracy since it permitted the proletariat to capture political power, it has a negative connotation in later theories.

The concept of the hegemonic bond's exteriority is also apparent in Lenin, who sees hegemony as a political direction founded on a class alliance. This alliance, on the other hand, does not result in the modification of class identities as a result of the inclusion of other groups' claims. Instead, there is a distinct demarcation between the leading and led sectors, distinguished by a more authoritarian political practise, and connections between the vanguard and the public are exclusively external and manipulative. It is clear that Lenin reproduces the Russian social democratic dichotomy between normal task and hegemonic class (Laclau and Mouffe, 2004, pp. 86-88).

According to Laclau and Mouffe (2004, pp. 100-102), Gramsci's conception of hegemony was a true watershed in Marxist thought because it broadens the terrain attributed to political recomposition and hegemony beyond class alliances, affirming the need for intellectual and moral leadership that allows social groups to move away from a corporatist posture and join the interests of other groups. This intellectual and moral leadership requires that various social groupings share ideas and values, and it is the foundation for the construction of a collective will that, through ideology, becomes the historical bloc's unifying organic cement.

The authors claim that the Gramscian paradigm of intellectual and moral leadership permits us to believe that certain subject views cut across various social classes.

3. Furthermore, Gramsci's conceptions constitute a shift in regard to Leninist philosophy, allowing for the visibility and theorization of the hegemonic bond's relational character, which had previously been hidden. The introduction of the Gramscian definition of ideology, which identifies the particular terrain of its composition, allows for the creation of a series of new social interactions (Laclau and Mouffe, 2004, p. 101). Gramsci's theory of ideology, according to Laclau and Mouffe, represents a break with the negative notion of ideology and the deterministic model of ideology based on the base-superstructure in favour of a material conception (Barret, 1996, p. 246). According to the writers, ideology is defined as

an organic and relational whole represented in apparatuses and institutions that binds a historical bloc together around some basic articulatory principles (Laclau and Mouffe, 2004, p. 101).

Another shift enabled by Gramsci is a break with the reductionist problem of ideology, because neither political subjects are viewed as classes, nor do the ideological elements articulated by the hegemonic class have to be class-relevant. Political subjects are the product of political and ideological articulations of scattered and fragmented historical forces, and they correspond to collective wills. Gramsci also expands the concept of contingency, because social elements lose their connection to the stage paradigm, and their meaning is dependent on hegemonic articulations, which are not guaranteed by any historical law; "the various elements and tasks lack any identity apart from their relationship with the forces that hegemonize them" (Laclau and Mouffe, 2004, pp. 101-103).

Despite his progress in comparison to other Marxist discourses, Gramsci does not totally transcend classical Marxism's dualism, as he advocates two principles that are not subject to hegemonic conflict because they are generated in the economic infrastructure, which is not subject to hegemonic reasoning. These principles correspond to the unifying principle's uniqueness as well as its required class character. As a result, class hegemony is not solely the result of political conflict, but also presupposes an ontological base. This ambiguity is clearly visible in Gramsci's concepts such as the war of position, which is constituted, on the one hand, as an advance in relation to classical Marxism insofar as the identity does not appear fixed from the start and is constituted in the process, and on the other hand, as a regression in relation to classical Marxism insofar as the identity does not appear fixed from the start and is constituted in the process.

Thus, Laclau and Mouffe (2004, pp. 22-23) argue that Gramsci's ideas are only a transitional stage in the deconstruction of classical Marxism's essentialist political paradigm, and that it is necessary to go beyond his ideas to deconstruct the very notion of social class, which is central to understanding contemporary societies. The authors' theoretical goal in Hegemony and Socialist Strategy is to fill up the gaps left by classical Marxism, based on a reflection that takes as its starting point Gramsci's conceptual framework, particularly his hegemony theorization. They attempt to connect Gramsci's political-interpretative logic with radical philosophical criticism, based on post-structuralist reflections, particularly Lacanian theory and Derrida's deconstructionism.

They are classified as post-Marxists because they reinterpret the Marxist tradition and dispute the applicability of its fundamental concepts to current society, as well as deconstructing some of the tradition's central assumptions. They maintain, however, that they only agree with this designation if it is viewed as a process of intellectual reappropriation. They also emphasise that the development of this task cannot be considered an internal history of Marxism, because it is crucial to the postulation of new starting points for social analysis because crucial problems for understanding contemporary society - such as the emergence of new social antagonisms - are not included in Marxist discourse (Laclau and Mouffe, 2004, p. 10).

According to Joanildo Burity (1997), post-Marxism entails reconciling with the Marxist legacy by opposing objectivism, essentialism, and determinism, as well as demonstrating that the progressive abandonment of these categories has a history within Marxism, as evidenced by the evolution of concepts like hegemony. As a result, the new method is built on the privilege of the moment of political articulation, and the concept of hegemony is a crucial component of this political analysis (Laclau and Mouffe, 2004, p. 10).

According to Laclau and Mouffe (2004, pp. 10-12), it is necessary to adopt a distinct ontological stance in this shift to post-Marxism, in which they reject the notion of society as a whole that defines all forms of structural arrangements through its rules. internal. They, on the other hand, regard the social's openness as constitutive; similar to

"negative essence" of what is already there [...] There is no sutured place we can think of as a "society," because the social would be devoid of substance (Laclau and Mouffe, 2004, p. 132).

Furthermore, because the open and incomplete nature of the social is a precondition of all hegemonic practises, no hegemonic logic can account for the entirety of the social, for a new suture would be produced, and the idea of hegemony would be eliminated (Laclau and Mouffe , 2004, p. 186).

In this sense, structural undecidability is a requirement for hegemony to be possible. It is impossible to think of contingent hegemonic rearticulations and politics as an independent activity without undecidability and contingency. As a result, hegemony is defined as making decisions based on inconclusive criteria. Undecidability, according to Burity (1997, p. 17), does not prevent decision-making, but rather defines the absence of an immanent law or logical necessity.

The Althusserian concept of overdetermination is thus crucial in establishing the landscape on which an acceptable concept of articulation may be built. Overdetermination is formed in the symbolic realm and has no meaning outside of it. When Althusser claims that there is nothing in the social that isn't overdetermined, he's referring to the social as a symbolic order. The overdetermined nature of social relations suggests that they lack ultimate literality and that an ultimate literal meaning cannot be determined. In this manner,

The essence of society and social agents would be lost, and their regularities would be limited to the relative and insecure forms of fixation that have accompanied the development of a specific order (Laclau and Mouffe, 2004, p. 134).

This idea was established by Althusser in order to depart from conventional essentialism's condemnation of all sorts of fixation as well as the open and incomplete nature of all identities. Despite the fact that it was unable to totally break from Marxism since it refers to the economy as the final arbiter, it gives the theoretical framework for thinking about identity as relational (Laclau and Mouffe, 2004, p. 142). The identity of a term is determined by the relationship it forms with other terms in a system of distinctions, not by the term itself. Furthermore, insofar as unassimilable or oppositional discursive frameworks preclude the closure of a totality, every identity is regarded unstable and historically placed. In this way, any form of suturing or closure's neutrality might be questioned."

Following the presentation of each identity's relational aspect, Laclau and Mouffe (2004, pp. 142-143) define articulation as

any exercise that creates such a bond between elements that their identities are altered as a result of the practise. We'll name the structured totality that results from articulatory practise discourse.

The discourse category is meant to underline that every social configuration is meaningful, and that the meaning of a given social event is not supplied in advance, nor is it inherent to it; rather, it emerges through a system of interactions. The discourse is the system of interactions that gives meaning to the object (Burity, 1997, pp. 7-8).

Despite attributing to their conception of discursive formation a type of internal coherence very similar to that elaborated by Foucault - regularity in dispersion - Laclau and Mouffe (2004) emphasise that they distinguish themselves from the latter in the distinction he makes between discursive and extradiscursive. Every object is constructed as a discourse object for them, and no object is given at the margins of every discursive emergence surface. Burity puts it thus way: (1997, p. 7),

Both dimensions, words and deeds, are part of a larger configuration that gives them meaning and determines their interrelationships - a discourse in the Wittgensteinian sense.

Despite the difficulties of establishing a meaning, the social only exists as an attempt to construct this impossible object through partial fixations of meaning, because without this, there is no way to distinguish or undermine a meaning. The discourse is thus constructed with the goal of dominating the discursive field, halting the flow of differences, and establishing a centre. Nodal points are discursive points that are favoured in the partial fixation of meaning. According to Laclau and Mouffe (2004, p. 154)

The partial nature of this fixation is therefore the practise of articulation; and the partial character of this fixation is derived from the opening of the social, which is derived from the perpetual overflow of all discourse through the infinity of the field of discursivity.

In the new approach to the concept of hegemony, the concept of antagonism is also important. Insofar as the presence of the Other precludes the formation of the self, the hostile relationship makes the formation of full identities impossible. The power that opposes, on the other hand, does not have a full presence, but simply exists as a symbol of non-being. In this way, antagonism defines the boundaries of all objectivity, the perception of the social's limit and its inability to fully constitute itself, because it never succeeds in establishing society (Laclau and Mouffe, 2004, pp. 168-169). The significance of hostility stems from the fact that it precludes any final reconciliation and a completely inclusive we; the ideal of a public sphere free of exclusions and dominated by rational reasoning is a conceptual impossibility. Even for the establishment of a democratic and pluralistic politics, conflict and disagreement are necessary (Laclau and Mouffe, 2004, p. 18).

In this sense, the democratic enterprise must acknowledge that there is no definitive conclusion and that all forms of consensus are the outcome of hegemonic articulation. The authors also stress that this articulation must emerge through a confrontation with hostile articulatory practises; otherwise, hegemony is impossible to define. In this approach, the presence of antagonistic forces and the fragility of the borders that divide them correspond to the required conditions for the creation of a hegemonic articulation. Faced with a field surrounded by antagonisms and the openness of the social, the hegemonic relationship is made feasible by the phenomena of equivalence and the phenomena of border (Laclau and Mouffe, 2004, p. 179).

The logic of equivalence tends to reduce the political space to two antagonistic and irreconcilable domains, whereas the logic of difference tries to extend and complicate it. Because a negative identity cannot be explicitly expressed positively, the equivalence of its differential moments is used to represent it indirectly. Mutual distinctions are negated or redefined in the equivalence relation due to the primacy of what is same to all of them yet cannot be positively constructed. Certain discursive forms use equivalence to invalidate an object's positivity and give negative an actual reality (Laclau and Mouffe, 2004, pp. 171-174).

According to the authors, the dialectic generated between the logic of difference and the logic of equivalence enables the universality of the hegemonic relationship, which is defined in a very precise and specific way, because the hegemonic tie modifies subject identity. They assert that

The sole means of representation can be a particularity whose body is divided, because it converts its body into the representation of a universality that transcends it - that of the analogous chain - without ceasing to be particular. This is what we term a hegemonic connection, in which a particularity assumes the representation of a universality that is completely incommensurable with the particularity in issue (Laclau and Mouffe, 2004, p. 13).

As a result, universality is always in conflict with particularity and is always reversible. The authors emphasise that this is the only sort of hegemonic universality that the political community can accomplish. Furthermore, given the new social configuration, in the midst of fragmentation and the creation of new social antagonisms, the authors argue for the need to establish a new hegemony by establishing a chain of equivalences between diverse fights against various types of subordination ( Laclau and Mouffe, 2004).

One of the requirements for rethinking the socialist project in terms of democratic radicalization is that this be done. "Democracy emerges as a vista of potential of the hegemonic fight towards a plural and open notion of the social" in this scenario (Burity, 1997, p. 17). The new left's concept of radical and plural democracy aspires to radicalise the 18th-century "democratic revolution," which incorporated the principles of equality and freedom into the social imaginary in order to expand them to many areas. more and more of society and the state4 (Laclau and Mouffe, 2004, p. 23). Joanildo Burity (1997, p. 18) highlights the authors of Hegemony and socialist strategy's reservation that democratic logic, viewed as an attempt to eradicate subordination relations, is insufficient for the establishment of a hegemonic machinery. It is also vital to develop a positive policy that allows for the establishment of a new social order.

Laclau and Mouffe, according to Michèle Barrett (1996, p. 250), address crucial issues for thinking about contemporary society, such as the displacement of social class advantage as an ontological category in favour of other salient social divisions like sex and ethnicity. In this approach, she emphasises that there is a growing interest in these authors' work not only in academia, but also in practical political engagement on both sides of the traditional right/left divide.

It is possible to discern the places at which Laclau and Mouffe approach Gramsci, as well as the points of rupture, in their brief exposition on the approach to hegemony. Both methods place a premium on the time of political articulation and conceptualise the social interactions that surround the hegemony contest. They also acknowledge that hegemony is not exercised over the entire society. Both approaches promote the development of a new hegemony based on subaltern group alliances or, in the case of Laclau and Mouffe, the creation of a chain of equivalences. Gramsci's articulatory practise, on the other hand, alludes to a fundamental social class. Ideology, understood as constitutive of the social, plays a crucial role in both approaches. Furthermore,

The primary point of divergence between the two approaches is that, while hegemony in Gramsci refers to the unity of the entire historical bloc, Laclau and Mouffe reject any form of suture since they believe it is unachievable. Every attempt to bring meaning to a close and solve it is ideological. These positions are a direct reflection of the writers' societal project. While Gramsci believes that socialism and a classless society are attainable, in which the party and political action disappear, Laclau and Mouffe believe that no definitive reconciliation is possible since antagonism is inherent in the social and has an open and unfinished character. They argue that democracy has no place on neutral ground in this fashion."

Other resources

P. ANDERSON, P. ANDERSON, P. ANDERSON, P. ANDERSON Western Marxism: Some Thoughts Brasiliense is the name given to the city of Sao Paulo in Brazil.

M. BARRT, M. BARRT, M. BARRT, M. BARRT, M "From Gramsci to Laclau and Mouffe: Ideology, Politics, and Hegemony." S. ZIZEK, S. ZIZEK, S. ZIZEK, S. ZI (org.). An ideological map. Rio de Janeiro is a contrast.

COUTINHO, COUTINHO, COUTINHO, COUTINHO, COUTINHO, A study of Gramsci's political philosophy. Campus in Rio de Janeiro.

A. GRAMSCI, A. GRAMSCI, A. GRAMSCI, A. GRAMSCI, A History is a dialectical idea. ____. 1978b. Rio de Janeiro: Brazilian Civilization. Politics, Machiavelli, and the Modern State ____. 1978c. Rio de Janeiro: Brazilian Civilization. Intellectuals and the culture of the company. , Rio de Janeiro: Brazilian Civilization, , , , , Volume 5 of the prison notebooks. Rio de Janeiro is the capital of Brazil.

L. GRUPPI, L. GRUPPI, L. GRUPPI, L. GR Gramsci's concept of hegemony. Rio de Janeiro is the Holy Grail.

E. LACLAU, E. LACLAU, E. LACLAU, E. LACLAU "Discourse". R. GODDIN and P. PETTIT, R. GODDIN and P. PETTIT, R. GODDIN and P. PETTIT (orgs.). The Blackwell Companion to Political Philosophy is a collection of essays on political philosophy published by Blackwell. . . . . . "The Ideology Theory's Death and Resurrection." In: Rhetoric, Mysticism, and Politics. ; MOUFFE, C. 2004. Buenos Aires: Fund for Economic Culture of Argentina. Hegemony and socialist strategy: democratic radicalization Argentina's Fund for Economic Culture is based in Buenos Aires.

MACCIOCHI, M., MACCIOCHI, M., MACCIOCHI, M., M In Gramsci's favour. Rio de Janeiro is a city dedicated to peace and the environment.

H. PORTELLI, H. PORTELLI, H. PORTELLI, H. PORT The old block and Gramsci Rio de Janeiro is a city dedicated to peace and the environment.

"Deconstruction, hegemony, and democracy: Ernesto Laclau's post-Marxism," J. Burity, J. Burity, J. Burity, J. Burity, J. Burity, J. Burity, J. Burity, J. Burity, J. Burity, J. You can find it at. On the 16th of June, 2009, I was able to get a hold of some information

This second generation of Marxism is distinguished by its detachment from the proletariat as well as a more scholarly and university-like outlook. It's vital to note that Gramsci had to leave politics since he was detained by Mussolini's regime in 1926 for his political activities as one of the founding members and senior leaders of the Italian Communist Party, as well as his outspoken opposition to fascism.

According to Laclau and Mouffe (2004, p. 62), what allowed Bernstein to shift his strategy in favour of political articulation was his realisation that even economic evolution did not lead to delays and increased polarisation, and that the transition to socialism could not be expected after an economic crisis.

Subject positions within a discursive framework are diametrically opposed to the privilege of social classes and the guarantee of their unity based on similar interests indicated by their position in production relations. Every subject position, in this sense, is a discursive stance that participates in the open nature of discourse and does not totally set these views in a closed system of distinctions (Laclau and Mouffe, 2004, p. 156).

The writers use the term "democratic revolution" to refer to a movement that began in the 18th century and attempted to end hierarchical relationships through the spread of equality and freedom. Despite asserting that this objective is impossible to fully realise, the authors recognise that these principles have been integrated into common sense through liberal-democratic ideology and some socialist matrix discourses.

Summaries of the concept of hegemony from Gramsci to Laclau and Mouffe

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